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climate change anD the StateS: 
conStitutional iSSueS aRiSing FRom State climate pRotection leaDeRShip
by Robert K. Huffman & Jonathan M. Weisgall*
InTroDucTIon 
As state, local, and federal legislators develop policies to address global climate change, the United States may soon face the difficult political and legal necessity of 
reconciling multiple—and potentially conflicting—state, local, 
regional, and federal climate change programs into a compre-
hensive national policy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This 
Article reviews some of these programs and explores several 
constitutional issues that may arise from state programs designed 
to combat climate change.
The causes of climate change 
are not completely understood, 
but there is now widespread 
agreement that humans are hav-
ing an impact on the climate, pri-
marily from carbon dioxide and 
other greenhouse gases (“GHG”) 
that are emitted from burning 
fossil fuels. As these gases accu-
mulate in the atmosphere, they 
trap heat close to the earth’s sur-
face, causing myriad effects on 
our delicate ecosystem. 
Regulators and policymak-
ers at the local, state, federal, and 
international levels are taking various actions to understand cli-
mate change and reduce GHG emissions. The first major action 
occurred in 1990, with the release of the first report by the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”).1 This was the 
first time that a detailed scientific endeavor was undertaken to 
study the climate change phenomenon. The IPCC’s first report 
led to international action, with the creation of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”). The 
UNFCCC is an international environmental treaty, adopted in 
1992 at the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development in Brazil.2 It created a UN Secretariat to oversee 
the Convention and substantively serves as a framework for fur-
ther negotiations on detailed protocols aimed at reducing world-
wide GHG emissions. 
KyoTo proTocol
Five years after the UNFCCC was created, at the Third 
Conference of the Parties in Kyoto, Japan, an agreement was 
reached to create binding emission reduction targets for indus-
trialized nations. This 1997 agreement, known as the Kyoto Pro-
tocol, came into force on February 16, 2005, after being ratified 
by the required number of parties that represent a specified mini-
mum percentage of worldwide GHG emissions.3 
The Kyoto Protocol is in effect only through 2012. Negotia-
tions are currently underway to craft a successor agreement that 
would operate through at least 2020. This was the focus of the 
December 2007 Conference of the Parties 13 in Bali, Indonesia. 
These meetings resulted in an agreement, now known as the Bali 
Roadmap, to complete further negotiations over the coming two 
years.4
The United States, how-
ever, has not adopted the Kyoto 
Protocol, objecting to the inclu-
sion of industrialized nations 
(Annex I Parties) but not the 
developing world. Seeing this as 
a competitive disadvantage that 
could cause significant harm to 
the U.S. economy, the govern-
ment has refused to adopt the 
binding emissions limits called 
for in the Kyoto Protocol. Aside 
from the United States, every 
industrialized nation, includ-
ing the European Union, has 
adopted the Kyoto Protocol. 
The Kyoto Protocol provides three “flexibility mechanisms” 
that allow countries to reduce the costs of achieving their emis-
sions reduction targets. These mechanisms are the Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism (“CDM”), Joint Implementation (“JI”), and 
emissions trading. The CDM allows Annex I Parties to imple-
ment projects that reduce emissions in non-Annex I Parties, in 
return for Certified Emission Reduction (“CER”) credits.5 JI 
allows Annex I Parties to implement projects in other Annex 
I Parties that either reduce emissions or enhance carbon sinks, 
in return for Emission Reduction Units (“ERU”).6 CDM and JI 
projects are subject to a verification and certification process, in 
order to ensure the legitimacy of any CER or ERU credits that 
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are generated by the projects. Emissions trading, the final mech-
anism, is a market-based strategy for reducing GHG emissions. 
emiSSionS tRaDing SyStemS
Under the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I Parties may develop 
internal emissions trading markets or link together with other 
Annex I Parties to create larger trading markets. An emissions 
trading market contains a system-wide cap on emissions that 
decreases over time, thus ensuring that overall GHG emissions 
within the system decrease as well. The system-wide cap and 
market features give rise to the general term cap-and-trade to 
describe these emissions markets. 
The emissions credits that can be traded are of a standard 
form, with each credit equal to one metric tonne of carbon diox-
ide equivalent emissions.7 This 
is the basic unit of currency in 
the emissions reduction world.8 
In designing and operating car-
bon markets, the single most 
important issue is consistency 
and quality control in measur-
ing emissions. If a tonne from 
one facility is not equal to a 
tonne from a neighboring facil-
ity, the market cannot operate 
properly. Therefore, without adequate monitoring, verification, 
and reporting procedures, emissions markets will fail to deliver 
actual emissions reductions.9 
euRopean union emiSSionS tRaDing SyStem
The most significant market developed under the Kyoto 
Protocol flexibility mechanisms is the European Union Emis-
sions Trading System (“EU-ETS”).10 The EU-ETS, which 
began operation in 2005, is comprised of twenty-seven European 
member nations and sets a cap on the total emissions that can 
be  generated from power stations, certain large industrial facili-
ties, and oil refineries. Facilities covered by the EU-ETS must 
report their total emissions annually and surrender a number of 
allowances equal to their total GHG emissions. Some allow-
ances are distributed to facilities for free, others are auctioned 
by governments, and others can be purchased on the market 
from traders, governments, or other entities that possess them 
(including allowances generated by credits in CDM or JI proj-
ects). If a facility has extra allowances after it surrenders those 
necessary to match its annual emissions output, it can sell them 
for profit. This provides an economic incentive to consistently 
reduce emissions at a facility. On the other hand, if a facility 
does not have enough allowances to cover its surrender require-
ment, it will have to purchase additional allowances to make up 
the shortfall. This serves as an incentive to reduce GHG emis-
sions, particularly if the cost of the allowances in the market is 
greater than the cost of making modifications that lead to emis-
sions reductions. 
The current phase of the EU-ETS runs through 2012, to 
coincide with the timeframe of the operation of the Kyoto Proto-
col. Regardless of whether there is a global agreement to replace 
the Kyoto Protocol, the EU-ETS will continue to operate, at least 
in a modified form. In January 2008, the European Commission 
released proposed rules for the next phase of the EU-ETS, which 
will run from 2013 to 2020.11 The proposals will change several 
details in the operation of the market and include a provision 
that would allow the EU-ETS to link with trading systems in 
countries that have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, something 
that is not permitted in the current phase. This is interpreted as 
a clear overture to the United States to link its future emissions 
market(s) to the EU-ETS. 
u.s. FeDeral ghg polIcy
The federal government has yet to pass legislation or 
issue regulations covering GHG emissions. In January 2007 a 
group of major corporations and 
prominent environmental groups 
formed the United States Climate 
Action Partnership (“US CAP”) 
and released a report entitled A 
Call for Action.12 Its goal is to 
put pressure on Congress to adopt 
legislation regulating GHG emis-
sions, including a comprehensive 
cap-and-trade program. While it 
may seem odd for a group of the 
largest corporations in America to advocate for potentially costly 
regulation, they have come to realize that regulatory uncertainty 
and its concomitant risks may exact a greater long-term eco-
nomic cost than comprehensive—but definite—legislation. 
As of this writing, no comprehensive federal climate change 
legislation has been adopted. One major cap-and-trade bill, 
sponsored by Senators Lieberman and Warner,13 is considered 
the leading proposal on Capitol Hill, but there is only a small 
likelihood of final passage in 2008.
The Energy Independence and Security Act,14 signed into 
law in December 2007, contains several provisions that are 
intended to reduce GHG emissions, but it falls short of the com-
prehensive legislation advocated by US CAP and others. The Act 
includes the first increase in Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
(“CAFE”) standards for automobiles since they were enacted in 
1975, requiring average fuel economy of thirty-five miles per 
gallon in 2020.15 It also includes provisions to improve energy 
efficiency in homes and buildings,16 a renewable fuel standard 
(mandating the production of at least thirty-six billion gallons 
of biofuels by 2020),17 and other provisions to meet President 
Bush’s “20 in 10” challenge for reducing gasoline usage by 
twenty percent in ten years. 
A recent House Committee on Energy and Commerce white 
paper looked at the proper role of federal, state, and local gov-
ernments in any comprehensive carbon regulation scheme.18 
Working under the assumption that the federal government 
would eventually enact a cap-and-trade program like the Lieber-
man-Warner bill, the white paper revealed potential situations in 
which state and local leadership could lead to either increased 
emissions, increased overall costs, or both. It makes the argu-
ment that “climate change is a global, not local, problem, perhaps 
No comprehensive federal 
climate change legislation 
has been adopted.
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providing less need for allowing States to be more stringent.”19 
As a result, “a more stringent State program may just shift the 
location of, rather than decrease, national emissions . . . .”20 This 
would occur when regulated entities move their operations from 
states with higher (i.e., more expensive to comply with) stan-
dards to ones that follow the lower, federal standards. 
The white paper does note, however, that state and local 
authorities do have a significant, complementary role to play in 
the effort to reduce GHG emissions. For example, building codes 
that mandate the use of better insulation in new homes would 
cause higher initial prices for consumers, but provide long-term 
savings as a result of lower energy bills. These measures “could 
capture . . . otherwise lost or uncovered emission reductions, and 
thereby decrease the societal cost of achieving greenhouse gas 
reductions.”21 The white paper also recognizes the importance 
of adequate and efficient monitoring, reporting, and verification 
of emissions. “It is probably more efficient to authorize State, 
Tribal, and/or local governments to inspect sources to deter-
mine compliance with national monitoring and record-keeping 
requirements than it would be to leave that exclusively to Fed-
eral inspectors.”22 
Many state leaders, frustrated at slow federal action to 
address climate change, are implementing both comprehen-
sive and piece-meal programs at the state level to help reduce 
GHG emissions. The following section discusses the actions 
that states have taken on their own to reduce GHG emissions, 
focusing heavily on cap-and-trade programs. Next, this Article 
raises and analyzes the constitutional issues that may arise as a 
result of state responses to this pressing global problem, focus-
ing heavily on the constitutional issues raised by attempts to link 




Although the United States is not a signatory to the Kyoto 
Protocol, there are several efforts underway to establish state- or 
regional-level trading systems. These follow not only the model 
of the EU-ETS, but also other successful domestic cap-and-trade 
programs administered by the EPA, including the Acid Rain 
Program.23 
California is in the process of establishing its own cap-
and-trade program. In September 2006, California adopted the 
Global Warming Solutions Act, also known as A.B. 32.24 This 
law, in part, allows the state to establish a cap-and-trade program 
to help meet the goal of capping the state’s emissions at 1990 
levels by 2020 and eventually reaching eighty percent below 
1990 levels by 2050.25 The program would be administered by 
the California Air Resources Board (“CARB”), which is in the 
process of adopting a scoping plan to identify California’s pri-
mary strategies for reducing GHG emissions under A.B. 32. The 
goal would be to have the cap-and-trade program operating by 
January 1, 2012.26 Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger has openly 
expressed an interest in linking any cap-and-trade program, once 
it is open for business, with the EU-ETS market.27
In addition to California’s intrastate efforts, three interstate 
groups are currently in the process of establishing carbon mar-
kets. One project, known as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initia-
tive (“RGGI”),28 was initially formed in 2003 and is now made 
up of ten states in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic: Maine, New 
Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecti-
cut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland. In addi-
tion, several eastern Canadian provinces have expressed interest 
in joining RGGI. 
The consortium administering RGGI has published model 
rules for each of the states to adopt, and all ten states are in the 
process of adopting them in statutory or regulatory form. The 
goal is to have the market operating by January 2009. At this 
point, it appears likely that the market will be ready to open at 
that time, although all ten states may not be participating at the 
outset, as a few may have outstanding issues to resolve in the 
early stages of the program. 
The second multi-state group, known as the Western Cli-
mate Initiative (“WCI”), consists of seven Western states and 
two Canadian provinces: Arizona, California, Montana, New 
Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, British Columbia, and 
Manitoba. The WCI was established in February 2007, and as 
a result is not as far along in the process as RGGI. WCI is cur-
rently in the design phase, having completed basic design princi-
ples and established a year-long work-plan.29 Its goal is to have 
the design of the market-based mechanism completed in August 
2008. Based on this timeline, it is unlikely that the WCI will be 
able to establish a functioning market before 2011 or 2012. 
A third group, consisting of nine Midwestern states and 
the Canadian province of Manitoba, signed the Midwestern 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord in November of 
2007, which is designed to establish greenhouse gas reduction 
targets, a regional cap-and-trade protocol, and a regional system 
to track and manage greenhouse gas emissions.30
Renewable poRtFolio StanDaRDS
A renewable portfolio standard (“RPS”) is a state-level 
mandate requiring electric utilities to obtain a certain percentage 
of their power from renewable resources. Twenty-four states and 
the District of Columbia currently have RPSs, while four other 
states have non-binding goals for adopting renewable energy.31 
A typical RPS might call for having twenty percent of 
energy produced from renewable resources by 2020. Currently, 
Minnesota and Oregon have the highest standards calling for 
twenty-five percent renewable energy production by 2025.32 
The renewable resources that qualify for state RPS programs 
generally include wind, solar (concentrated and photovol-
taic), geothermal, and biomass. Nuclear power does not satisfy 
RPS requirements and cannot be used to meet the renewable 
standards. 
auto emiSSionS RegulationS 
The Clean Air Act (“CAA”) prohibits states from issuing 
their own auto emissions regulations. There is one exception that 
applies only to California, as California was the only state regu-
lating auto emissions prior to the enactment of the CAA in 1966. 
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Section 209(b) of the Act allows California to seek a waiver 
from the EPA, which shall be granted unless “the Administrator 
finds that—(A) the determination of the State is arbitrary and 
capricious, (B) such State does not need such State standards 
to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions, or (C) such 
State standards and accompanying enforcement procedures are 
not consistent with section 202(a)” of the CAA.33 Other states 
then have the choice of adopting the federal rule or the Califor-
nia rule. 
Citing the fact that automobile emissions account for 
roughly forty percent of GHG 
emissions in California, the Cali-
fornia Greenhouse Gas Reduc-
tion Bill of 2002, known as A.B. 
1493, requires CARB to adopt 
“regulations that achieve the 
maximum feasible reduction 
and cost-effective reduction of 
greenhouse gases from motor 
vehicles.”34 The regulations 
are not fuel economy standards 
per se, but instead regulate the 
amount of GHG emissions that 
automobiles sold in the state 
may produce. 
In 2004, CARB promul-
gated regulations pursuant to 
A.B. 1493 calling for a reduction 
in emissions by automobiles totaling over fifty million tonnes of 
carbon dioxide by 2030.35 This equates to a twenty-seven per-
cent reduction in automobile emissions by 2030. California for-
mally sought a waiver from the EPA in December 2005.36 Since 
California adopted its regulations, sixteen other states have fol-
lowed its lead and passed laws requiring automobiles to meet the 
California standards. 
After the April 2007 Supreme Court decision in Massachu-
setts v. EPA,37 in which Massachusetts won a significant victory 
that formally establishes EPA’s authority to regulate GHG gases 
as pollutants, Governor Schwarzenegger met with EPA Admin-
istrator Stephen Johnson to encourage EPA to grant California’s 
waiver application. However, in December 2007, Administrator 
Johnson notified California that the waiver application would be 
denied, on the grounds that California’s situation does not meet 
the “compelling and extraordinary conditions” test.38 Identify-
ing global climate change as a worldwide problem and citing 
the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007,39 which 
increased CAFE standards, the EPA determined that California’s 
more strict GHG emissions reduction rule may not be enforced. 
This was the first time, after more than fifty successful applica-
tions, that a waiver request under Section 209(b) was denied by 
the EPA.40 
California and several other states have since sued the EPA, 
and the case is currently pending in federal court.41 For  advocates 
of state action to slow the impacts of climate change, the waiver 
denial was both a significant blow to their efforts and a rallying 
cry. Regardless of one’s views on the merits of the EPA deci-
sion, the decision underscores the importance of clarifying the 
role of the states, as this waiver decision is likely to be a major 
court battle lasting several years and costing millions of dollars. 
gReenhouSe gaS peRFoRmance StanDaRDS
In January 2007, California became the first state to adopt 
a greenhouse gas performance standard (“GGPS”).42 This is a 
facility-based emissions standard, affecting electric utilities, 
which requires that all new long-term baseload generation com-
mitments in California produce 
no more emissions than a com-
bined gas cycle turbine plant.43 
It prohibits load-serving entities 
(investor-owned utilities, energy 
service providers, and commu-
nity choice aggregators) from 
entering into long-term finan-
cial commitments (five years 
or more) for baseload genera-
tion with higher than proscribed 
emissions, regardless of the type 
of fuel used in the plant.44 
This means that no new 
coal-fired plants can be built 
in California, nor can existing 
plants make significant capital 
improvements that do not con-
form to the GGPS. In addition, it prohibits California utilities 
from contracting to import power from out of state that does not 
comply with the emissions requirements of the GGPS.45 
consTITuTIonal Issues
The United States’ system of federalism allows the federal 
and state governments to share power in certain areas, while 
each maintains exclusive areas where the other may not regu-
late. The power of the federal government is constrained by the 
Constitution and does not include general police powers, which 
are reserved to the states.46 State governments, however, may 
not regulate certain aspects of interstate and foreign commerce, 
foreign affairs, and other areas of reserved federal power.
When states take actions to regulate greenhouse gases, it 
raises questions about the extent of state authority to regulate 
the economy and the environment. Linking emissions trading 
programs or enacting auto emissions regulations brings states to 
the far end of their regulatory authority, given the transborder 
nature of emission trading and carbon dioxide emissions gen-
erally. This section explores the constitutional issues that can 
potentially arise from state actions to reduce GHG emissions.
commeRce clauSe
The Commerce Clause, Article I, § 8, cl. 3, gives the federal 
government the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States[.]”47 The Supreme Court 
has long considered the Commerce Clause to be “an implicit 
When states take actions 
to regulate greenhouse 
gases, it raises questions 
about the extent of  
state authority to regulate 
the economy and  
the environment.
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restraint on state authority, even in the absence of a conflicting 
federal statute.”48 This concept is known as the Dormant Com-
merce Clause—wherein the Constitution acts as a prohibition 
on certain types of state actions that affect interstate commerce, 
invalidating the state law by negative implication.49 
Although the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine has 
gained widespread acceptance, at least two current Supreme 
Court justices (Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas) reject it alto-
gether. Regardless of these two justices, it is highly unlikely that 
a majority of the Court would reject the Dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine. Were the doctrine to be rejected by the Court, 
state actions would never be invalidated for conflicting with 
unexercised congressional power under the Commerce Clause, 
but would be subject to invalidation only for express or implied 
preemption by federal law. 
The basic test for whether a state law violates the Commerce 
Clause is to look first at whether the law discriminates on its face 
against out-of-state entities or transactions.50 If there is facial 
discrimination, which essentially means a protectionist measure 
that is written in a manner that singles out foreign entities or 
transactions for disadvantageous treatment when compared to 
their in-state counterparts, then the state law will be invalidat-
ed.51 If there is no facial discrimination, the state law can still 
run afoul of the Commerce Clause if it places unwarranted bur-
dens on interstate commerce in a particular application or range 
of applications.52 “Where the statute regulates even-handedly to 
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on 
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless 
the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in 
relation to the putative local benefits.”53 
A linked cap-and-trade program may raise questions of dis-
crimination. One of the biggest issues with establishing regional 
cap-and-trade programs is “leakage,” which occurs when a reg-
ulated entity imports cheaper, higher-polluting power from an 
area outside the program to evade cap obligations. For example, 
if an electrical utility in a state covered by RGGI did not possess 
enough allowances for the current year, and it was more eco-
nomical to purchase coal-fired electricity from the neighboring 
state than to buy allowances on the open market, the emissions 
produced by the neighboring utility company would “leak” into 
the regulated space of the cap-and-trade system when the elec-
tricity was purchased by the RGGI-covered company. 
This leakage issue creates a serious problem for regula-
tors. If the trading system allows or remains silent on importing 
power from states that leave GHG emissions unregulated, the 
credibility of the program as a whole will become suspect. At 
the same time, if the regional system were to attempt to ban the 
purchase of any power from non-member states, there would be 
at least a colorable argument of facial discrimination. In order 
to avoid these problems, the designers of regional cap-and-trade 
programs like RGGI will have to find innovative solutions that 
can protect the integrity of the emissions reduction mechanisms 
while at the same time avoiding potential constitutional pitfalls. 
Linking a state or regional cap-and-trade program with a 
foreign trading system like the EU-ETS would raise unique con-
stitutional issues not present in a wholly domestic linkage situa-
tion. Emission trading linkages with foreign parties would create 
a whole host of problems, from verification and standardization 
of credits at an international level to accounting and securities 
disclosure laws and regulations. Credits created by European 
entities would require some sort of regulation under federal 
securities and/or commodities law. The federal government 
would have a good argument that states should not be involved 
in activities over which they do not have full control. Because a 
state cannot independently regulate securities and commodities 
markets, it may be impossible for a state or group of states to 
provide adequate oversight of a market linked to international 
participants. 
In addition, the Dormant Commerce Clause can potentially 
affect attempts to institute greenhouse gas performance stan-
dards. This would not be a discrimination issue, as the perfor-
mance standards are facially neutral. Rather, courts would have 
to look at whether the performance standards unduly burden 
interstate commerce. If California’s rules prohibit long term con-
tracts for the in-state sale of energy from out-of-state coal-fired 
plants, out-of-state producers are likely to cry foul and sue over 
the lost business from California’s utilities. At that point, the 
courts would have to weigh the relative benefits of California’s 
standards against the burden they place on interstate commerce. 
compactS clauSe
The Compacts Clause, Article I, § 10, cl. 3, reads in part: 
“No state shall, without the consent of Congress, . . . enter into 
any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign 
power[.]”54 
In reviewing claims under the Compacts Clause, courts 
look generally to whether states are attempting to enhance their 
power at the expense of the federal government. 
Where an agreement is not ‘directed to the formation 
of any combination tending to the increase of political 
power in the States, which may encroach upon or inter-
fere with the just supremacy of the United States,’ it 
does not fall within the scope of the Clause and will not 
be invalidated for lack of congressional consent.55
The first question that courts look at is whether a contractual 
arrangement, such as a cap-and-trade system, reaches the point 
of being a “compact” under the Compacts Clause. If it is a com-
pact, then it generally must be approved by Congress or it will 
be invalid.56 Once approved by Congress, it reaches the level 
of federal law. Thus, for an unapproved state-to-state or state-
to-foreign-party relationship to be valid, it must not reach the 
formality of being a “compact” for these purposes.
To answer the first question, whether an arrangement is an 
agreement or compact, the courts look to the general indicia of 
a compact. The Supreme Court summarized the relevant factors 
in Northeast Bancorp v. Federal Reserve,57 a decision involving 
an agreement by holding companies to purchase banks: 
The . . . statutes . . . both require reciprocity and impose 
a regional limitation . . . . But several of the classic indi-
cia of a compact are missing. No joint organization or 
body has been established to regulate regional banking 
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or for any other purpose. Neither statute is conditioned 
on action by the other State, and each State is free to 
modify or repeal its law unilaterally. Most importantly, 
neither statute requires a reciprocation of the regional 
limitation.58
From the passage above, one can draw some general criteria 
for determining whether a contractual relationship is an agree-
ment or compact. There should be some sort of joint organiza-
tion or body to govern the agreement, if necessary. It should be 
binding; that is, no state can freely remove itself from the agree-
ment. And it must require a reciprocity of the regional limitation, 
meaning that one party cannot agree to a nationwide program 
while another believes the agreement only covers a handful of 
states. 
Regarding a regional cap-and-trade program, courts are 
unlikely to find that RGGI or a similar program is a compact, 
unless the agreement contains language that conditions actions 
(in one state) on actions by other states and is not freely revo-
cable by participant states. It appears, based on Northeast 
 Bancorp, that a voluntary union, which allows for a state to back 
out should it not want to participate, would not be considered a 
compact for the purposes of the Clause.
However, it is difficult to see how a linked international 
cap-and-trade framework could be crafted so as not to consti-
tute a compact or even a treaty, which would be impermissible 
under Article I, § 10, cl. 1, regardless of the presence or absence 
of congressional approval. In order to have a properly function-
ing linkage between markets, there would need to be guaran-
tees regarding enforceability and permanence. Without legally 
enforceable guarantees about the quality of the credits being 
traded, the markets are unlikely to succeed. There would be a 
serious problem, for example, if an offset project in California 
created credits that were purchased by a steel manufacturer in 
France, and California de-linked itself from the markets. The 
problem of how the French manufacturer would account for the 
credits in the absence of a monitoring or verification mechanism 
to account for what is happening in California is a significant 
one. The only way to ensure the integrity of the credits being 
traded in the marketplace is to create a framework that is robust 
enough to protect all of the parties involved. This would presum-
ably include the inability to voluntarily leave the program and 
would be most easily accomplished with some sort of central 
emissions registry that aggregates and processes data from all 
participants. These components are almost certain to create a 
compact under the Compacts Clause, which would then require 
congressional approval in order to be valid. 
SupRemacy clauSe
The Supremacy Clause, Article VI, cl. 2, defines the Con-
stitution and laws made “in Pursuance thereof” as “the supreme 
Law of the Land[.]”59 This provision allows federal law to pre-
empt state law in certain circumstances. 
“Even without an express provision for preemption, we 
have found that state law must yield to a congressional Act in 
at least two circumstances,” the Supreme Court noted in U.S. 
v. Locke.60 “When Congress intends federal law to ‘occupy the 
field,’ state law in that area is preempted. And even if Congress 
has not occupied the field, state law is naturally preempted to the 
extent of any conflict with a federal statute.”61
A presumption of non-preemption arises in disputes involv-
ing the traditional police powers of the states; despite the pre-
sumption, even the police powers will yield when Congress 
clearly intends to supersede state law.62 In addition, when there 
is a history of significant federal presence in the area of regula-
tion, there is no presumption of state law validity.63 
With a cap-and-trade system, the question is whether any 
federal law creates a conflict or if the federal government other-
wise occupies the field. At this point, Congress has not passed 
any legislation that would present a direct conflict with a multi-
state cap-and-trade system. Indeed, the federal government has 
been remarkably absent from the field of greenhouse gas regula-
tion in general. 
In the wake of Massachusetts v. EPA,64 the federal govern-
ment’s inaction becomes even more stark. The Court noted that 
“EPA has not identified any Congressional action that conflicts 
in any way with the regulation of greenhouse gases from new 
motor vehicles.”65 Although issued in the context of federal 
regulations rather than state statutes, the point is the same: the 
federal government has not taken efforts to regulate GHG emis-
sions. Massachusetts v. EPA held that EPA has the authority 
to regulate GHG emissions from automobiles because they fit 
within the statutory definition of “air pollutant” under § 202(a)
(1).66 The case was remanded to the EPA for the agency to either 
make a finding of endangerment and regulate auto emissions or 
provide a reasoned judgment as to why GHGs do not contribute 
to global warming and can thus escape regulation.67 
Even if the EPA decides to regulate GHG emissions from 
autos, that would not necessarily provide a conflict for a cap-
and-trade program. Most proposals for cap-and-trade programs 
only regulate tailpipe emissions indirectly. If they capture the 
transportation sector, it is done upstream through regulating 
the fuel industry, rather than limiting actual vehicle emissions. 
As a result, it is unlikely that any forthcoming rule stemming 
from Massachusetts v. EPA would preempt state cap-and-trade 
 initiatives. 
The best case for federal preemption would arise if the 
federal government instituted a similar cap-and-trade system 
or other form of comprehensive carbon emissions regulation. 
Any program that created a nationwide price for carbon would 
likely be interpreted as directly conflicting with state programs; 
in the alternative, courts would probably hold that federal efforts 
occupy the field of GHG regulation. But lacking such a program, 
as is currently the case, it is difficult to see any way in which 
a state-organized cap-and-trade program could be preempted 
under the Supremacy Clause. 
Some congressional leaders are advocating for express pre-
emption in any future comprehensive cap-and-trade bill. The 
Dingell-Boucher white paper,68 which discusses the role of 
federal, state, and local governments in efforts to reduce GHG 
emissions, makes the case for express preemption. “[O]nce a 
national, economy-wide cap-and-trade program is adopted, State 
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or regional cap-and-trade programs may interfere with the effi-
cient functioning of the Federal cap-and-trade program[.]”69 As a 
result, “Chairman Dingell has made it very clear that he believes 
that motor vehicle greenhouse gas standards should be set by 
the Federal Government, not by State governments[.]”70 In addi-
tion, the analysis finds that compliance costs and overall system 
costs (including regulatory overhead) are likely to be higher in 
any duplicative system of federal and state/regional regulation.71 
While the current version of the Lieberman-Warner bill actu-
ally encourages and provides incentives for states to take actions 
above and beyond the federal cap-and-trade program,72 there is 
a possibility that an express preemption clause could be part of 
any final bill.
The Supreme Court recently looked at the scope of express 
preemption of state laws, which may be relevant as applied to 
future GHG regulations.73 In Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor 
Transp. Ass’n, several transport carrier associations sued Maine 
over regulations governing the conduct of carriers that deliver 
packages containing tobacco, as a way to help prevent youth 
from purchasing cigarettes through mail-order retailers. Federal 
motor carrier law expressly preempts any state from “enact[ing] 
or enforc[ing] a law . . . related to a price, route, or service of any 
motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of property.”74 
The state law, for example, required carriers to utilize a recipi-
ent-verification service, to ensure that the person who ordered 
the tobacco is also the recipient, and that the recipient is at least 
eighteen years old.75 
In holding that the state law was preempted, the court noted 
that “to interpret the federal law to permit these, and similar, 
state requirements could easily lead to a patchwork of state ser-
vice-determining laws, rules, and regulations. That state regula-
tory patchwork is inconsistent with Congress’s major legislative 
effort to leave such decisions, where federally unregulated, to 
the competitive marketplace.”76 This line of reasoning could be 
relevant, particularly for state efforts to regulate GHG emissions 
from automobiles. 
Although there has not been affirmative congressional 
action to deregulate GHG emissions, as there was with the motor 
carrier industry, the threat of inconsistent state regulations is a 
significant tool for the federal government to yield. The threat 
of a patchwork of state laws was one of the major reasons EPA 
Administrator Johnson decided to reject California’s application 
for a waiver—even though there could never be more than just 
the federal standard and the California standard in that instance. 
The easiest way to prevent the threat of a patchwork of standards 
is to include in any federal legislation an express preemption 
clause that prohibits states from acting in a given area.77 Should 
the federal government adopt comprehensive carbon legislation, 
it is likely to include some level of express preemption of state 
laws to ensure a consistent approach for the entire country. This 
will inevitably lead to legal battles that delay the implementation 
of any comprehensive carbon regulation program. 
inteRFeRence with FoReign aFFaiRS
The power to conduct foreign affairs is vested exclusively 
in the federal government. Aspects of the power are constitu-
tionally divided between the President in Article II (e.g., power 
to make treaties) and the Congress in Article I (e.g., power to 
raise an army, declare war). States do not play a role in foreign 
affairs, as it is important for the federal government to be able to 
speak with one voice on behalf of the national interest for mat-
ters involving foreign affairs. 
Generally, the only cases where courts have struck down 
laws as interfering with foreign affairs power are “state or local 
laws purporting to set up their own authorities as mini-state-
departments, with power to oversee and either approve or dis-
approve foreign regimes or the negotiation efforts of the U.S. 
Executive Branch[.]”78
In Zschernig v. Miller,79 the Supreme Court invalidated 
an Oregon law that prevented a nonresident alien from inher-
iting property unless certain conditions were met—primarily, 
a reciprocal right for Americans in the alien’s country and the 
assurance that any property received in Oregon would not be 
confiscated at home. Noting that states are the typical forum 
for probate matters, the Court still found the law problematic. 
“The several States, of course, have traditionally regulated the 
descent and distribution of estates. But those regulations must 
give way if they impair the effective exercise of the Nation’s for-
eign policy.”80 Zschernig involved a citizen of East Germany, a 
country with which the United States had no treaties regarding 
inheritance. Regardless, “even in absence of a treaty, a State’s 
policy may disturb foreign relations.”81 
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council 82 is the first in 
a line of recent foreign affairs cases that focus on state attempts 
to limit contact with foreign countries. The Crosby court heard 
a challenge to a Massachusetts law that prohibited state entities 
from buying goods or services from companies doing business 
with Burma.83 At the time the law was passed, there was no simi-
lar federal prohibition, although a federal law providing for sanc-
tions on Burma was enacted a few months later. Although the 
Court spoke specifically of the Supremacy Clause, the decision’s 
rationale focused heavily on how the Massachusetts law tied the 
President’s hands and thus reduced his leverage against Burma. 
We need not get into any general consideration of lim-
its of state action affecting foreign affairs to realize 
that the President’s maximum power to persuade rests 
on his capacity to bargain for the benefits of access 
to the entire national economy without exception for 
enclaves fenced off willy-nilly by inconsistent political 
tactics.84 
The Crosby reasoning was followed recently in an Illi-
nois case.85 The district court there looked at an Illinois law 
that regulated contact with and investment in Sudan and deter-
mined that the state law was unconstitutional, based primarily 
on Supremacy Clause grounds. There was, however, extensive 
discussion of the foreign affairs powers in the decision. Under-
standing that the federal government has a unique and exclusive 
role in carrying out the country’s foreign policy, the court noted 
that “the degree of impact a state law has or might have on the 
national government’s conduct of foreign affairs is the relevant 
inquiry.”86 In National Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias, 
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requiring pension funds to divest from Sudan, while potentially 
raising difficulties for the fund managers, did not interfere with 
the federal government’s authority to conduct foreign affairs.87 
The Giannoulias ruling also contains dicta that is support-
ive of state efforts to reach non-discriminatory agreements with 
foreign entities: the court indicates that “it does not appear that 
state and local governments are prohibited from entering into 
‘sister state’ agreements or other bilateral agreements with sub-
national foreign governments or foreign trade associations.”88
Finally, in American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi,89 the 
Supreme Court extended the ruling in Crosby to areas where 
there was no explicit federal statute, but merely executive agree-
ments between the President and heads of foreign states. Gara-
mendi involved a California law requiring any insurer in the state 
to disclose information about all policies sold in Europe between 
1920 and 1945. This was seen as a way of ensuring that claims 
belonging to Holocaust victims were paid to any survivors and 
their heirs living in California. 
President Clinton, however, had made executive agree-
ments with Germany, Austria, and France so that all claims 
against German insurance companies relating to the Holocaust 
would be heard by an international commission established for 
that purpose.90 The Court noted that the President has consider-
able authority in the area of foreign relations and can act inde-
pendently of Congress. “While Congress holds express authority 
to regulate public and private dealings with other nations in its 
war and foreign commerce powers, in foreign affairs the Presi-
dent has a degree of independent authority to act.” 91 Thus, con-
gressional silence does not undermine the executive agreements, 
which can, even without an explicit conflict, preempt state laws. 
Garamendi was a 5-4 decision, with Justices Rehnquist and 
O’Connor in the majority. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, which 
was joined by Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Thomas, focused 
on whether there was an explicit conflict between the executive 
agreement and the state law. Without such a conflict the dissent-
ing Justices would not allow an executive agreement to preempt 
a state law. Justice Ginsburg also noted that “the notion of ‘dor-
mant foreign affairs preemption’ with which Zschernig is asso-
ciated resonates most audibly when a state action ‘reflects a state 
policy critical of foreign governments and involves ‘sitting in 
judgment’ on them.’”92 
Applying the case law above to a scenario in which states 
attempted to link to a foreign trading system, the lack of a coher-
ent federal policy on GHG regulation at this point strongly points 
to the constitutionality of such a linkage. The biggest potential 
problem would occur if there is federal legislation that makes 
mention of international linkages, or if the President makes clear 
statements concerning national priorities for GHG regulation 
that conflict with linking domestic trading systems with their 
international counterparts.
Perhaps just as important, any attempt to link to foreign 
emissions trading systems will be viewed very differently from 
the Crosby and Giannoulias cases. States attempting linkages 
will not be disparaging or otherwise passing negative judgment 
on foreign parties, as occurred in those cases involving state laws 
prohibiting or restricting commerce with rogue nations. Without 
that factor, it is difficult to imagine how courts could find any 
sort of interference with America’s foreign policy prerogatives. 
Thus, cap-and-trade system linkages are likely permissible over-
tures to international partners, particularly if the federal govern-
ment still has not undertaken a comprehensive scheme of carbon 
regulation. 
conclusIon
State governments continue to demonstrate leadership in 
combating climate change —from adopting energy efficiency 
standards to enacting renewable portfolio standards to develop-
ing cap-and-trade programs aimed at reducing carbon dioxide 
emissions, often as part of regional compacts. At the same time, 
the Congress is in the process of developing national climate 
change legislation and agencies in the Executive Branch are 
defining their roles. As the federal and state governments begin 
regulating the same areas of the economy and the environment, 
the potential for conflicting programs arises. 
State programs are potentially vulnerable to a variety of 
constitutional challenges, including through the Commerce, 
Compacts, Supremacy, and Foreign Affairs clauses. As the fed-
eral government solidifies its approach to global climate change 
over the next several years, the likelihood for preemption of 
state programs will become more evident. It is apparent now, 
however, that state programs are in serious jeopardy if the fed-
eral government actively seeks to restrict state authority. If the 
current or future President does not want states to play an active 
role in climate change regulation, he or she will have several 
constitutional tools at their disposal to handicap the states’ abili-
ties to create programs that reduce GHG emissions. 
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